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1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to identify the institutional areas that most constrain Benin’s economic 
development, relying on expert opinion as it appears in databases that provide international 
comparisons of institutional and related indicators, or as can be gathered locally through a 
dedicated survey. The first section of this chapter is devoted to systematic comparisons of 
Benin with other countries, based on available governance-related indicators. The second 
section describes the survey carried out for the present study with a selected sample of 
decision makers in various areas and occupations. The final section synthesises the main 
lessons to be drawn from the preceding exercises and examines their degree of consistency 
with the conclusions of several growth diagnostic studies recently conducted on Benin.  
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2 Benin’s institutional quality in an international 
perspective  
Three international databases will be used to compare Benin's institutional quality with that 
of other countries. The first is the Quality of Government (QoG) database (Teorell et al., 
2018). This is probably the most complete database available related to institutions. It 
comprises more than 2,000 indicators from more than 100 sources. Many fewer indicators 
are systematically available for low-income or lower middle-income countries – which are 
those that can be used as meaningful comparators for Benin. Nevertheless, there are still 
close to 200 indicators for such countries. In a previous use of that database1, a clustering 
analysis has been used to summarise this set of indicators into six synthetic indicators, 
based on the proximity of the inter-country profile of the original indicators they comprise. It 
is those synthetic indicators that are used in the present section.   
The second database is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). This also relies on a 
wide collection of original databases. Instead of using a statistical method to aggregate all 
the individual indicators present in those databases, the aggregation is done a priori by 
broad governance areas and then the first principal component is extracted from country 
observations, which makes it possible to summarise the differences across countries in a 
single indicator of the quality of governance in that area – see Kaufmann et al. (2010). Six 
indicators covering different governance areas are derived in that way.   
The third database is simply the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
indicators gathered annually by the World Bank staff, re-aggregated in five broad clusters2.  
Other well-known databases like Transparency International or Polity IV could have been 
used independently of the preceding sources but there would have been some redundancy 
in doing so, as they are already included in the QoG and WGI databases.   
Benin’s institutional quality, as described by these three sets of synthesised indicators, is 
compared against two groups of developing countries: neighbouring countries in Central and 
West Africa, and a group of countries that have performed better than Benin in terms of 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the past decades despite being initially at a 
comparable level3. Ideally, the comparison of institutional quality should refer to that initial 
stage, to see whether countries that initially had better governance overall did better in a 
subsequent period. Such a historical comparison is possible (although somewhat 
problematic) with the WGI database, but not with the others. 
2.1 Benchmarking Benin against neighbouring countries  
Benin shares direct borders with four countries, namely Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger, and 
Nigeria. We were, however, unable to include Niger and Togo in our comparison due to lack 
of data. We instead included other countries in the same geographical area: Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana. Figure 1 compares the institutional performance of Benin and its 
                                               
1 Bourguignon and Libois (2018). 
2 Out of the 12 basic ratings appearing in the World Development Indicators. 
3 Analysis could also have included countries that were poorer than Benin before 1990 but that have now become richer (e.g. 
Botswana and China). Another comparator group could be defined to include countries with income levels comparable to that of 
Benin in 2016 (the most recent year for which data that allow international comparison are available). It turns out they would not 
have delivered different conclusions for Benin.  
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  3 
Democratization
Equal implementation














Rule of  LawBusiness environment
Public Management
neighbouring countries using the three databases described above, and at different points of 
time for WGI and the CPIA.  
Figure 1: Governance synthetic indicators: Benin and its neighbours 
 


































Legend: Burkina Faso (full black), Côte d’Ivoire (dashed red), Benin (blue), Ghana (magenta), Cameroon (dotted 
































Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  4 
Even though the synthesised indicators constructed based on the three databases often 
have similar names, as can be seen in Figure 1, they do not necessarily cover the same 
concepts. This would be the case for the indicator entitled 'control of corruption'. In the QoG 
database, this indicator is combined with the equal implementation of the law, which is part 
of the 'rule of the law' in the WGI and the CPIA. Likewise, human rights in the QoG refers to 
personal liberties but also to the provision of public services to individuals, including 
education, healthcare, or social assistance, something that is behind the 'people' label in the 
CPIA database. Other indicators are conceptually closer to each other even though they 
have not been given the same name. This is the case of 'business environment' (CPIA), 
'regulatory quality' (WGI), or 'private sector competitiveness' (QoG). This is also the case of 
'government effectiveness' (WGI), 'administrative capacity' (QoG), and 'public management' 
(CPIA). The same can be said of 'democratisation' (QoG) and 'voice and accountability' 
(WGI).  
With the precaution required by this heterogeneity of indicators attached to different 
databases, we now examine the kind of differences in the quality of institutions they suggest 
exist between Benin and neighbouring countries.  
The convergence across databases is stronger may be apparent at first sight. Three 
synthetic indicators appear at least twice as relative weaknesses in the 2015–16 data: 
business environment (QoG and CPIA); government effectiveness (QoG, CPIA); and the 
control of corruption (QoG and WGI). On the side of the relative strengths of Benin, voice 
and accountability or human rights are unanimously better than in the comparator countries, 
the same being true of 'political stability' in WGI or the absence of conflict and violence in the 
QoG.  
The lack of full convergence in areas that seem to be well defined across the three 
databases may seem surprising. As mentioned earlier, however, the concepts behind the 
corresponding synthetic indicators may differ. For instance, new policies to control corruption 
may be praised in the CPIA corruption indicator, whereas other databases focus on the fact 
that the level of corruption remains unchanged. Likewise, some indicators may stress 
structural obstacles in 'doing business', like insufficient infrastructure, whereas others will put 
more emphasis on the government’s attitude towards business. The cost of relying on 
synthetic indicators is precisely that it is not possible to get into this kind of detail, this being 
the reason why an institutional diagnostic must necessarily go beyond this kind of aggregate 
analysis.   
The comparability over time of the WGI indicators is somewhat uncertain because the 
number of databases used to build them has substantially expanded over the last two 
decades. Yet the relative position of countries along the various indicators should not be too 
greatly affected by this problem. From that point of view, no noticeable change in the ranking 
of Benin took place over these two decades, except for 'regulatory quality' (i.e. business 
environment), where Benin tends to progressively lag behind Ghana and Burkina Faso over 
time.  
The comparability over time of the CPIA governance quality indicators is probably better 
than for WGI because they are supposedly based on a homogeneous methodology. There, 
the most noticeable change is again the worsening of the business environment both in 
absolute terms and relatively to neighbour countries.  
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Overall, the appraisal of the quality of institutions in Benin through aggregate indicators and 
the comparison with neighbour countries points to three weaknesses: the control of 
corruption, the business environment, and public management. Benin does not exhibit the 
worst performance in these areas at any point in time, as Cameroon and Nigeria most often 
lie behind. However, it is generally the case that Benin does not do as well as Ghana, which 
dominates all the other countries in 2015–16 according the WGI indicators, or as well as 
Burkina Faso. Over time, moreover, it would seem that regress rather than progress is 
observed in the business environment.  
2.2 Benchmarking Benin against better-performing developing 
countries 
We now compare Benin with five developing countries whose level of economic 
development was similar to Benin in the early 1990s but that have had higher per capita 
GDP growth rates over the past 25 years and have now become substantially richer than 
Benin. These are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao, Vietnam, and Tanzania. Figure 2 presents 
the comparison using the same three sets of indicators in the same periods as in the 
preceding figure. Of course, the profile of Benin in all radar charts is the same. What matters 
now is how Benin compares to those countries which were able to grow faster, both today 
and in the past at a time when all of the countries were at a comparable level of GDP per 
capita.   
Figure 2: Governance synthetic indicators: Benin vs. better-performing countries 
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Legend: Bangladesh (full black-), Cambodia (dashed red), Benin (blue), Laos (magenta), Vietnam (dotted black), 
Tanzania (dashed green) Looking first at the three radar charts in the left-hand column of the figure, the common 
feature is that, in comparison to these better-performing countries, Benin does not do well in public management 
and private sector competitiveness. Except for this, Benin turns out to be quite comparable to the other countries 
when considering the WGI indicators. It even performs relatively well on corruption. The latter advantage is still 
more pronounced with respect to the CPIA indicators. Overall, it would thus seem that, paradoxically, better-
performing countries do systematically worse than Benin on that account.      
Things are a bit different with the QoG database. There, Benin's control of corruption 
appears to be among the worst. In the QoG database neighouring countries’ control of 
corruption are also worse than they appear according to the WGI and CPIA indicators, 
confirming the different understandings of the concept of 'corruption control' in the various 
databases. The same is true of business environment in the QoG database, where Benin 
performs rather worse than comparator countries, whereas it ranks at or close to the median 
in the other databases.  
Another somewhat surprising result is the under-performance of Benin according to the 
'people' indicator in the CPIA database. The point here is that, under the general heading of 
social inclusion and equity, that indicator puts a great weight on education. The interpretation 
to be given to the gap observed for Benin is therefore that fewer or lower quality public 
efforts are devoted to human capital accumulation. Better-performing countries have 
invested more than Benin in that institutional aspect of development. This was not 
systematically the case when the comparison was with neighbouring countries.   
Looking now at the radar charts for earlier periods, Benin’s human capital gap is fully 
confirmed on the CPIA for 2005. It is also noticeable that over the last decade or so Benin 
has lost the comparative advantage it initially enjoyed in its business environment relative to 
better-performing countries. This finding raises the issue of whether initial institutional 
advantages, as measured by the kind of synthetic indicator used here, are responsible for 
the faster development of these countries, or whether it is their development that created 
such advantages.  
One reaches the same conclusion when looking at the three WGI charts. Clearly, Benin was, 
roughly speaking, doing better than other countries in 1996. In particular, its radar profile 
dominated that of Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Tanzania in all areas. If it had not been for 
corruption, it would also have dominated Lao and Vietnam. Paradoxically, however, all of 
these countries grew much faster than Benin in the subsequent 20 years.  
2.3 Conclusion on international comparison 
What lessons may be drawn from this review of available international governance and 
institutional synthetic indicators? The first must be the lack of convergence of indicators from 
different databases that are nevertheless supposed to cover comparable areas. This 
discrepancy can only be explained by heterogeneous conceptual definitions, but it also casts 
some doubt on the true meaning of any single synthetic indicator of the type so frequently 
used in the cross-country development literature. Being analytically more rigorous would 
require using much more precise indicators, but this would increase the number of indicators 
to be used and would add to the inconclusiveness of the analysis.  
Second, concerning Benin, the three potential sources of institutional weakness revealed by 
the analysis are: the control of corruption, a business environment that is possibly less 
favourable than that in other countries, and efficiency issues in public management 
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(although cross-country differences were rather small on that latter account). Another 
important weakness seems to lie in the public investment in 'people', most likely due to an 
under-performing educational system.  
These are extremely general conclusions and, therefore, of limited use for policymakers. 
Remedying this would require getting into more detail to try to identify what is exactly making 
the business environment unfavourable or public management ineffective. As mentioned 
earlier, however, multiplying the number of dimensions of this type of international 
comparison would quickly render any results impossible to interpret. Other approaches must 
be developed to make use of the general indications delivered by the preceding analysis.  
Such approaches are pursued in the rest of this chapter and the accompanying chapters of 
the diagnostic.  
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3 A survey of experts' opinions on Benin’s institutional 
quality 
The goal of this section is to derive further insights about the quality of institutions in Benin 
on the basis of opinions obtained from decision makers in the private and public sectors, as 
well as from the civil society, who are directly exposed to these institutions. An opinion 
survey has been conducted with a sample of such people. The questionnaire was adapted 
from the one applied in a similar study in Tanzania to fit the reality of Benin. In the following 
paragraphs we first describe in some detail the methodology of this survey, before analysing 
its results and then underlining the lessons to be drawn in terms of institutional strengths and 
weaknesses of development in Benin.  
3.1 Methodology  
The survey of experts’ opinions about Benin’s institutional performance was developed in 
collaboration with Analysis for Economic Decisions, a Belgian consultancy, and a local team 
led by the director of Benin’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis, under 
the close supervision of the authors of the present chapter. The methodology included three 
main steps: questionnaire; sampling; and survey implementation.  
The format of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire was adapted from a similar survey carried out in Tanzania – see 
Bourguignon and Libois (2019), after translation into French and modifications required by 
the Benin context. Questions that were irrelevant to Benin were excluded, and new 
questions were added based on insights from the first chapters of this volume and a 
workshop with key decision makers that took place in August 2017 in Cotonou. A number of 
questions were also reformatted so as to facilitate communication during interviews. Finally, 
the questionnaire was coded into Survey CTO, allowing it to be implemented on tablets.  
The format of the questionnaire is somewhat original. It was initially conceived to cover most 
economic, political, and social institutional issues. As it was too long for a single respondent, 
and because all respondents would not be knowledgeable in all areas, a flexible format was 
adopted, where respondents would choose the areas they would focus upon. By doing so, 
however, they would reveal at the same time their opinion about the strength of the 
institutional constraints on development in the various areas they could choose from. 
Practically, the questionnaire consists of 10 subsets of questions, each one corresponding to 
a broad institutional area: political institutions, law and order, ease of doing business, public 
administration, etc. The list of areas appears in Table 1 below. First, respondents were 
asked to indicate which three of the 10 institutional areas they saw as including the most 
constraining factors for Benin’s economic development. Second, they were asked to give a 
relative weight to these three critical institutional domains, where a high value assigned to an 
area indicated that it is more detrimental to Benin’s economic development. Then, 
respondents had to answer those questions in the questionnaire that came under each of 
their three critical area headings, plus a fourth area chosen randomly in order to make sure 
that all questions in the questionnaire would be answered a minimum number of times.   
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
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Sampling 
The survey team developed a sampling strategy that relied on a demand-side/supply-side 
approach to analysing institutions. First, public or private entities – firms, public 
administrations, agencies, political parties, trade unions, etc. – were identified, some of them 
being involved in setting or managing institutions, whereas others were simple users of 
those institutions in their customary activities. Then, respondents were selected within these 
entities, preferably among senior managers or deputies.  
Table 1: Overview of the sample 
Category No. % Category No. % 
Public sector: total 131 33 Members of parliament 23 6 
Public administration  92 23 
Members of other constitutional 
bodies (supreme court, auditor 
general, ...) 
27 7 
Agriculture, commerce, industry 19 5 Trade-unionists 3 1 
Energy, water, mining 6 2 Donors 9 2 
Economy, finance, development 19 5 Civil society 24 6 
Education 11 3 Academics  10 3 
Health 9 2 Think tanks and charitable organisations 4 1 
Infrastructure, transport, 
communications 14 4 Media 10 3 
Sport, culture, tourism 8 2 Private sector 170 43 
Foreign relations 6 2 Formal private firms 82 21 
Law and order 15 4 Large firms and their associations 49 12 
Judiciary 7 2 Medium firms 10 3 
Military 4 1 Small firms 6 2 
Police 4 1 Micro firms 17 4 
Other administrations  24 6 Finance 12 3 
Executive 7 2 Banks and their associations 6 2 
Retired ministers 11 3 Microfinance institutions 6 2 
Local administrations 
(départements) 6 2 Informal firms 76 19 
Political institutions 62 16 Total 396 100 
Local politicians (communes) 9 2    
 
The sample comprises 396 respondents across five key groups of entities/experts, 
summarised in Table 1: public administration; judiciary; executive and legislative bodies; 
donors; civil society; and the private sector. Each group was further divided into subgroups 
with possibly a different relationship to similar institutions. For instance, the private sector 
group includes three subgroups: formal firms, informal firms, and financial institutions, and 
public administration includes sectors like education, health, or utilities.   
Two methods were used to select entities in each subgroup: an arbitrary selection and a 
random sampling approach. Arbitrary selection was used to select entities in official sectors, 
i.e. public administration, political institutions, civil society, or donors. Geographical diversity 
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
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('départements' and communes)  was also taken into account as much as possible4. A 
random sampling approach was implemented to select entities within the private sector 
subgroups – except for the financial sector, where specific executives were arbitrarily 
selected, for the same reason as in public sectors: that is, the reduced number of entities to 
be considered.  
Two specific strategies were used to randomly select formal and informal private firms. On 
the one hand, a database (Déclarations Statistiques et Fiscales, which includes 5,361 firms) 
was used to randomly select around 80 formal firms according to firm size, after stratifying 
the universe by size, but irrespectively of economic sector of activity. On the other hand, 75 
informal firms were randomly selected after stratifying by sector of activity and geographical 
area. The random selection was made by enumerators who had been assigned a location 
and a field of activity.  
Survey implementation 
The survey was implemented between December 2017 and early February 2018. Figure 3 
shows maps that display the locations of respondents’ entities (left panel).  




Source for Figure 3, right panel: INSAE, General Population and Housing Census (RGPH) 2013. 
                                               
4 The 'département' is the highest-level administrative unit in Benin, followed by commune, arrondissement, and village. Benin 
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The maps above show that respondents are spread across the country. However, it turns out 
that the Atacora department is not represented in the sample. Also, there is an over-
concentration of respondents in the southern (Ouémé, Atlantique, and Littoral) and north-
eastern (Borgou) parts of Benin – the departments where most of the arbitrarily selected 
entities are located. In particular, the city of Cotonou in the department of Littoral is home to 
many of the firms and governmental entities. It must be kept in mind, however, that the 
objective of the survey is not to poll the Beninese population but people with some 
knowledge and experience of the way various types of institutions function in Benin.  
The stratification by type of occupation and geographical areas reflecting this choice does 
not necessarily fit the geographical distribution of the population. Table 2 shows that, indeed, 
the sample of respondents is not representative of the Beninese population. 84% have a 
university degree and 27% have studied abroad. They are in their mid-40s on average, and 
most of them have a family. Perhaps because of the education bias, Christians are over-
represented in comparison with the whole population. If there is no strong bias in terms of 
ethnicity, there is in terms of gender: the sample is strongly dominated by males (82%). This 
feature reflects the gender distribution among senior managers in Benin. As a matter of fact, 
the only sector where a gender balance holds is among respondents operating in the 
informal sector.  
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Table 2: Main characteristics of respondents 
 Number % 
Demographic characteristics   
Beninese nationality 379 96 
African nationality (including Beninese) 384 97 
Age (average) 46  
Female 72 18 
Have a child 366 92 
Married (monogamous) 331 84 
Education   
Studied abroad 108 27 
University degree 331 84 
Main religions   
Catholic 231 58 
Muslim 62 16 
Evangelist 36 9 
Traditional 11 3 
Dominant Beninese ethnicities   
Fon 154 41 
Yoruba 71 19 
Goun 55 15 
Adja 53 14 
Bariba and Dendi 29 8 
3.2 Empirical results  
This section summarises the information derived from the expert opinion survey. This is 
done into two steps. First, we analyse responses to the question which three broad 
institutional areas, among the 10 areas listed in Table 3 and defined in more detail in Table 7 
in the appendix, are the most constraining for the development of Benin overall. Second, we 
gain a deeper understanding of the reasons behind those choices by analysing the 
responses to the specific questions that come under each broad area heading.  
Perceived institutional constraints by broad areas functioning of institutions  
The 'total' row in Table 3 reports the number of times each broad institutional area appeared 
among the three most critical areas for Benin's development mentioned by respondents. 
Two areas strongly dominate the others: the functioning of public administration, followed by 
the functioning of political institutions. Together, they account for one-third of all opinions. 
Some way after them comes a group of four other areas that each account for about 10–
11% of the total choices: law and order, justice, and security; ease of doing business; land 
rights; and social cohesion, protection, and solidarity. The four remaining areas – market 
regulation, long-term and strategic planning, security of transactions and contracts, and 
relations with the rest of the world – seem to be less critical. This may be because they are 
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
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seen as corresponding to more technical aspects of institutions, and therefore were probably 
more distant from the preoccupations of respondents.  
Table 3: Broad institutional areas by perceived weakness 
  
  





No. % Rank No. % No. % No. % 
A. Political institutions 201 16.9 2 170 42.9 17 4.3 14 3.5 
B. Law and order, justice, and 
security 126 10.6 4 40 10.1 63 15.9 23 5.8 
C. Public administration 230 19.4 1 76 19.2 110 27.8 44 11.1 
D. Ease of doing business 133 11.2 3 32 8.1 53 13.4 48 12.1 
E. Dealing with land rights 127 10.7 4 29 7.3 48 12.1 50 12.6 
F. Long-term and strategic 
planning 85 7.2 7 12 3.0 38 9.6 35 8.8 
G. Market regulation 83 7.0 7 15 3.8 39 9.9 29 7.3 
H. Security of transactions and 
contracts 21 1.8 10 2 0.5 8 2.0 11 2.8 
I. Relations with the rest of the 
world 63 5.3 9 6 1.5 9 2.3 48 12.1 
J. Social cohesion, protection, 
and solidarity 119 10.0 6 14 3.5 11 2.8 94 23.7 
Total 1188 100  396 100 396 100 396 100 
 
Equally interesting is the order of appearance of each institutional area in the choice of three 
areas by the respondents. It can be seen in the preceding table that political institutions was 
mentioned by 43% of the respondents as their first choice, followed by public administration, 
which also dominates the second choice. The third choice is dominated by social cohesion, 
protection, and solidarity. This result must be interpreted negatively, though. Indeed, that 
area (social cohesion, protection, and solidarity) appears to be of lesser importance in 
comparison with areas (e.g. areas B, D and E) that have more or less the same total number 
of mentions but that were mentioned more frequently as the first and second choice.  
As can be seen in Figure 4, the preceding ranking is changed only marginally when the 
weights respondents associated with the institutional areas they selected are accounted for. 
Political institutions and public administration remain strongly dominant. As a matter of fact, 
the right-hand panel in the figure shows that the average weight given to the institutional 
areas by those respondents who mentioned them as an obstacle to development is quite 
uniform, except, interestingly, for political institutions, which again dominates the others. The 
same results were obtained when respondents were asked to reveal their willingness to pay 
for improving those institutions, they found most critical for development.  
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Relative weight of institutional fields (average)
A: Political institutions B: Law & order, justice and security
C: Public administration D: Ease of doing business
E: Dealing with land rights F: Long-term and strategic plannig
G: Market regulation H: Security of transaction and contracts
I: Relation with the rest of the world J: Social cohesion & protection, solidarity
Figure 4: Weights assigned to broad institutional areas 
 
 
Respondents are expected to have heterogeneous views about institutional weaknesses. In 
order to gain insights into this issue a number of mechanical regressions were run where a 
dummy variable defined by whether a broad institutional area was seen as critical or not was 
regressed on some characteristics of respondents, namely: being a Beninese national; being 
a woman; managing a large, medium, or small firm; and being employed in a financial 
institution.   
These regressions are shown in Table 8 in the appendix. Among the noteworthy results is 
the fact that large and formal firm operators tend to have less distrust than other 
respondents with respect to political institutions – perhaps because they know better how to 
deal with them. The other side of the coin is that, more than others, they find that the 
business environment, including market regulation or the security of contracts, is an 
impediment to development. This attitude is still more prevalent among respondents working 
in financial institutions. More surprisingly, women also share this view, i.e. they place less 
emphasis on political institutions and more emphasis on business, possibly because they 
tend to be over-represented among small and micro entrepreneurs. As far as nationality is 
concerned, it is not clear that the distinction is meaningful given the tiny minority of 
foreigners in the sample. Not surprisingly, foreigners overvalue the business environment 
whereas nationals give more importance to land rights.     
Interactions between formal and informal institutions  
In a society where tradition very much matters, it was considered interesting to ask 
respondents about whether traditional institutions could be a good substitute for imperfectly 
working formal institutions, particularly those institutions dealing with business relationships, 
for instance security of contracts (Dhillon and Rigolini, 2011). In this regard, respondents had 
to choose out of five informal institutions those they considered to be a good substitute for 
imperfectly working formal institutions: religious leaders, traditional authorities, networks, 
other personal relations, and cultural masking traditions established during the precolonial 
period and backed by spiritual forces5.  
The responses suggest that the dominant informal response to institutional weaknesses are 
not the traditions inherited from precolonial times, but essentially private networks and, to a 
                                               
5 Zangbeto, Guelede, and Egoun. Given their spiritual nature, we would expect these traditions to play important roles in 
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lesser extent, traditional and religious leaders. This result was not unexpected given the 
rather high average educational level of the sample. Yet, the fact that a significant proportion 
of respondents mentioned traditional and religious leaders is evidence that formal institutions 
regulating interpersonal economic relationships are not fully established in the Beninese 
society, possibly because of the survival of traditional means of solving this kind of problem.  
Figure 5: The role of traditional institutions in Benin in solving interpersonal or inter-
business problems (%) 
 
In-depth perceptions of the quality of institutions in Benin 
We now go one step further by exploiting the detailed questions asked of the respondents in 
connection with the three broad areas they chose, and a randomly selected one. The full list 
of questions may be found online6. For the sake of simplicity, however, we shall not deal 
with these questions directly. We shall rather list the main lessons that can be learned from 
the answers. Before doing so, however, we must address some methodological issues in the 
identification of weaknesses and strengths revealed by the answers to the questionnaire.  
The response to all questions was coded on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 4: 0 defined as 
‘not at all’; 1 as ‘little/low importance’; 2 as ‘neutral’; 3 as ‘a lot’; 4 as ‘extremely’. In addition, 
respondents were allowed to reply with ‘I do not know’ when they could not provide relevant 
answers to a question. Note that some questions were asked in a negative way – for 
example, ‘To what extent does corruption constrain business?’ – whereas others were asked 
in a positive way – for example, ‘How well do you think local communities understand 
aspects of the land law that concern them?’. To make responses comparable across the 
questions, the answers were re-coded to the negative, so that all low response values can 
be interpreted as institutional weaknesses, and high values as strengths.  
The full questionnaire is very rich, as it includes more than 400 questions – even though the 
typical respondent had to answer roughly half of them, i.e. the areas he/she chose. To 
synthesise the answers, a number of methodological choices have to be made.  
Weaknesses and strengths are defined by average Likert scores below 1.5 for the former 
and above 2.5 for the latter. These cut-offs were defined on the basis of the distribution of 
average scores across all questions shown in Figure 6, which exhibits discontinuities at 
these values. Note, however, that relying on average scores raises the issue of how to 
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interpret responses with neutral opinions, i.e. those with scores equal to 2? 7 Is it a truly 
'neutral' response or a quick way to get rid of a question one cannot really answer? To take 
this ambiguity into account, questions were ranked in accordance to both their average 
score and that score after eliminating the 2-scores. However, the difference between the two 
rankings was marginal. The same was found when considering only the proportion of scores 
strictly below 2 for weaknesses and strictly above 2 for strengths. 
Figure 6: Distribution of average Likert score across questions in the overall 
questionnaire  
 
A first consistency check of this methodology of handling the answers to the various 
questions of the questionnaire consists of checking whether the scores of the questions 
under the heading of the 10 broad institutional areas fit the average ranking made by 
respondents in the first part of the interview. This is done in Figure 7. 
The first block on the left-hand side of that figure simply shows the relative frequency of 
questions across broad institutional areas in the questionnaire. For instance, 30% of all 
questions fall under the heading of 'political institutions'. However, it must be kept in mind 
that some questions appear under various headings. For instance, a question on the 
corruption of tax collectors would appear both under public management and ease of doing 
business.   
The two other blocks of Figure 7 are more interesting. They show the same frequencies but 
now restricting the universe to questions whose average score is below 1.5 (i.e. 
weaknesses) in the middle block and above 2.5 (strengths) in the right-hand block. What is 
interesting here is that the relative weakness of the broad areas is now slightly modified in 
comparison with the direct ranking operated by the population of respondents.  
It is still the case that public management is considered to be the weakest area since the 
frequency of questions with an average score below 1.5 is higher than the frequency of all 
questions in that area – and of course the frequency of questions with scores above 2.5 is 
lower. Yet the second weakest area now appears to be the ease of doing business, for 
which the same pattern holds. By contrast, political institutions, which were considered 
practically as bad as public management in the direct ranking (i.e. when no detail was given 
to the respondents about what precise issue this area was covering), now would be more on 
                                               
7 The response ‘no opinion’, i.e. responses with a score value of 99, were removed before the average values were estimated. 
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G: Market regulation H: Security of transaction and contracts
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the positive side: this area shows relatively more questions with high scores and less with 
low scores. This means that asking people about institutional weaknesses and strengths 
without first making them aware of what each area actually covers may be misleading. In the 
case of Benin, there are of course severe weaknesses in the way the political institutions 
work but respondents also point to very positive aspects, so that, overall, their opinion is 
certainly not as negative as when asked whether ‘political institutions work well or badly’ 
without further detail. This is not true, however, of public management and doing business, 
which are still considered to be major institutional weaknesses.  
Three other areas show some reversal of opinion when detailed aspects of the institutional 
area are given to respondents. The first is social cohesion, protection, and solidarity, where 
questions with high scores strongly dominate, and long-term planning, where the opposite is 
the case. In the former case, the problem may come from the fact that the title of the area 
comprises different concepts and it is not clear which one dominated in the mind of 
respondents when first confronted with it. It is possible, for instance, that they may have put 
more emphasis on social protection, which they consider to be weakness, and then realised 
when faced with the detailed questions that this area was also about traditional solidarity 
among people, which they considered to be a strength. For 'long-term and strategic planning' 
it is also probable that the understanding of that label was modified when respondents 
realised what it referred to. The third area that appears weaker than it was initially is land 
rights, where the frequency of low-score questions is twice that of questions about land 
rights overall.  
Figure 7: Frequency of questions under the headings of broad institutional areas by 
















In summary, the more detailed questionnaire showed some change in the ranking of broad 
institutional areas by relative weakness or strength. The main weaknesses revealed by the 
questionnaire are public management and ease of doing business, but, of course, it is now 
necessary to obtain deeper insights by focusing on individual questions and examining in 
more detail those with the lowest and highest scores. This is done in the next sections, 
which look successively at the revealed institutional weaknesses and strengths.   
3.1.1 Perceived weaknesses of institutions  
Instead of analysing one by one all the questions in the questionnaire that received an 
average score of less than 1.5, we list in what follows the main lessons that can be learned 
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from them. Because the questions address a large range of issues, this approach allows for 
a more detailed diagnostic of institutional weaknesses than simply ranking broad institutional 
areas, as was done earlier. 
Without doubt, corruption is the theme that appears most frequently among the questions 
that obtained the lowest average scores among respondents. It affects practically all aspects 
of political and economic life in Benin: the political system, the relationship between business 
and the public administration (rigged procurement) or the judiciary system, the electoral 
system (vote buying), land rights, or complicity between politicians and the media.  
Corruption is seen as responsible for several key dysfunctions in the political, judicial, and 
economic spheres.  
Another problem that is frequently mentioned, which also relates to corruption, or more 
exactly the difficulty of controlling it, is that the official rules of the political game, namely the 
constitutional rules, may be violated without the entities supposed to punish such behaviour 
taking action. The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Haute Cour de Justice, 
whose jurisdiction is the illegal behaviour of the executive, are generally found to be 
permissive or passive, the same being true of the parliament. It is quite possible, however, 
that this opinion among the respondents was strongly influenced by the debate at the time 
the survey was taken about several decisions by the incoming president, which some felt 
were in contradiction with the constitution8.  
The lack of transparency of state decisions and state action is another theme that attracts 
low scores. For instance, the criticism is made that no public discussion takes place about 
the execution of the budget or National Accounts, that the financial results of public and 
semi-public companies are not made public and not debated, that most decisions by the 
executive are taken in an opaque way, and that few evaluations are made of policies.  
A theme that is of importance is the understanding that citizens have of the law and the rules 
of the game. There was a single question addressing this issue in the questionnaire and it 
referred to land law. The general opinion in this respect was that local communities have a 
poor understanding of the law and cannot use it to protect themselves against illegal 
practices that would take the control of some land away from them.  
Concerning state-owned companies, their efficiency and management were severely 
criticised by respondents. This was especially the case for the company responsible for the 
production and distribution of electricity.  
Two additional points that are apparent in the responses to the questionnaire are worth 
stressing. The first is the low average score for the question about whether poverty reduction 
could be considered as the main objective of policymaking in Benin. The second is the view 
that dissensions do exist within the executive itself. Here again, however, it may be the case 
that the low score for that question was influenced by some specific event that took place 
during the time of the survey or a little before – despite the fact that respondents were 
explicitly asked to base their answers on the way they saw politics, economics, or the 
working of the administration over the 10 years preceding the survey, rather than basing it 
on current events and debates.    
                                               
8 See for instance https://lanouvelletribune.info/2017/12/benin-cour-resiste-talon-resiste/  
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Reported development bottlenecks also include: the dominant informal sector, Benin’s 
dependency on Nigeria, labour market nominal wage rigidity, and the frequent strikes in the 
public sector. All these constraints generate high costs for businesses and undermine 
competitiveness. However, it is not clear that they refer to institutional weaknesses strictly 
speaking.  
Table 4: Selected examples of detailed institutional weaknesses (low-score questions) 
Question9 Score10 
To what extent is corruption an obstacle to business development? 0.73 
Do you think the Haute Cour de Justice is able to impose the respect of the 
constitution? 0.76 
What is the degree of corruption linking the media and politicians?  0.82 
What is the degree of political corruption (vote buying, illegal campaign funding, 
bribes)?  0.83 
Does the government discuss the budget seriously with the civil society?  0.87 
To what extent do land transactions involve corruption in local communities?  0.90 
How much would you say the press and the media are independent from political 
influence?  0.96 
Do you trust the Haute Cour de Justice to impose the legal rules of the game on 
the main political and economic actors?  0.98 
To what extent are public procurement procedures fair and transparent?  0.98 
In your view, is poverty reduction a priority for political parties?  0.99 
What is the degree of corruption in the relationship between public 
administrations and Beninese companies?  1.00 
To what extent is the reliability of economic aggregates like GDP growth, the 
current account balance, or inflation discussed in parliament, in the media, and in 
the civil society?  
1.15 
How seriously are public accounts audited?  1.18 
To what extent are political dissensions obstacles to the implementation of public 
policies and reforms?  1.22 
3.1.2 Perceived strengths of institutions 
Strengths are supposed to be revealed by questions with a score above 2.5, i.e. a majority of 
respondents having selected the top value on the Likert scale. The main points that arise 
from reviewing these questions are the following.  
High levels of respondent satisfaction mostly centre on five domains, which are not always 
fully consistent with perceived institutional weaknesses. These are: i) civil liberties; ii) a 
                                               
9 Recall that scores are redefined depending on the question so that a low score denotes an institutional 
weakness. For instance, if the answer to the first question ‘To what extent is corruption an obstacle to business 
development?’ is ‘very much so’, and thus a Likert score of 4 is applied, it is redefined as 0 in agreement with the 
fact that this denotes a major obstacle to development. 
10 The reported score is the average 0/4 Likert scores after eliminating scores equal to 2. 
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sense that the state enjoys some autonomy in policymaking; iii) some trust in recent reforms; 
iv) a feeling of improvement in the ease of doing business; and v) national pride. 
On civil liberties, respondents expressed satisfaction with respect to the freedom given to 
people to form associations in practically all areas, from religion to politics. Equally important 
was the feeling of limited religious, ethnic, and political discrimination in recruitment and 
wage practices in the private sector. The lack of discrimination in the access to public 
services – schools, health facilities, justice, or security – was also highly valued. Consistent 
with these civil liberties, the lack of state repression was also stressed by respondents.  
The autonomy that respondents feel the Beninese state enjoys with respect to social, 
traditional, ethnic, and religious norms, or with respect to the army and the police, is certainly 
an advantage over some other countries. Yet this feeling may not be fully consistent with the 
importance of corruption so strongly emphasised among key institutional weaknesses. In 
other words, autonomy does exist with respect to some norms and some specific actors but 
it is probably more limited when dealing with big business or some other vested interests. 
The prevalence of corruption among the perceived institutional weaknesses of Benin was 
such that it is somewhat surprising that respondents tend to trust announced anti-corruption 
reforms. Or is it precisely because corruption has reached such a critical level that experts 
tend to agree on the need to fight it effectively? The confidence expressed in the positive 
impact of aid, or at least on the absence of the crowding-out effect of aid on domestic 
savings, is also unexpected at a time when aid effectiveness is increasingly open to doubt. 
Yet one may understand why such a point of view prevails in an economy where aid 
represents between 6% and 8% of gross national income. 
Table 5: Selected examples of detailed institutional strengths (high-score questions)11 
Question Score 
Does the state discriminate among citizens in regard to accessing: administrative 
services, justice, security, public school, healthcare centres, etc..  3.60 
To what extent is the army or the police involved in politics?  3.29 
In your opinion, is wage discrimination with respect to religion or ethnicity 
frequent in the private sector?  3.17 
How free do you feel people are to form associations of a religious, ethnic, 
professional, or political nature? 3.11 
Did the one-stop shop policy recently implemented in public administration 
improve doing business?  2.91 
In view of religious, traditional, or ethical norms, how free is the Benin state 
about policies and reforms in education, health, social services, and economic 
policy?  
2.90 
How strong is the national sentiment in Benin?  2.87 
Are traditional solidarity links effective in supporting people in need in rural 
areas?  2.80 
How repressive do you feel the Benin state is?  2.74 
Do you think that present reforms in the anti-corruption policy will lift constraints 
on development?  2.70 
 
 
                                               
11 Score is average 0/4 Likert scores after eliminating scores equal to 2. 
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Recent reforms seem to have improved the way business feels about the business 
environment, even though it was seen earlier that there were still many causes of 
dissatisfaction. The one-stop window for formalities and the shortening of registration delays 
were a source of satisfaction for business-oriented people among the respondents. The low 
probability of violent events or worker strikes in the private sector were also felt to be positive 
aspects of the business environment.  
Finally, the feel of belonging to a national community may not be easily related to the broad 
institutional areas that have been discussed in this paper. That it appears with a strong score 
in the questionnaires despite the ethnic diversity of the country is a positive sign: the 
probably of conflict and violence is therefore reduced, which should be favourable to 
business and long-term public planning.  
3.1.3 Perceived opinion on recent reforms 
Several reforms were recently initiated by the Talon administration, some of them with the 
ambition of improving the institutional framework of Benin's development. Respondents were 
initially asked to answer questions based on their knowledge and experience over the 
preceding 10 years, which is mostly before the Talon administration came to power. This 
was done in order to have a picture of expert opinion on Beninese institutions that would not 
be biased by the debate about the most recent reforms. Because of this, it seemed 
interesting to ask the experts briefly about these reforms, to check whether their views would 
differ.  
Four types of reform were launched by the new administration. The first consisted of moving 
activities initially under the responsibility of civil services to agencies formally outside the 
public sector. Their mission is the same, but they escape some of the constraints from 
operating in the public sector, thus making them potentially more effective. For instance, 
agencies were created to manage the construction of schools and health centres, and others 
were created to replace the public company, SONAPRA, which was responsible for 
agricultural promotion and rural development and price stabilisation; another agency was 
created to manage water projects, etc. These are potentially major reforms. It is of course 
too early to evaluate the reforms’ impact, but it is interesting to note that survey respondents 
were essentially either neutral or ambivalent with respect to them. Indeed, the average score 
for the questions about these reforms was very close to 2, and roughly 40% of respondents 
reported either 2 or did not answer the question. 12 
On a more positive side is the recent law that strengthens the land reform undertaken over 
recent years, and in particular the land titling operation launched in 2013 within the help of 
the US Millennium Challenge Account programme. One problem with the ongoing reform, 
however, is that a land title does not provide a definitive right until after five years, and it may 
be contested during this entire period. Indeed, several such contestations have taken place, 
and financial institutions that use land for collateral have experienced losses. As a result, 
they have become reluctant to accept land with temporary rights as collateral. To address 
this issue, the Talon administration passed a new law in late 2016 that gave landowners 
definitive rights. Survey respondents supported this reform, more strongly it should be said 
than they considered land rights to be an obstacle to development.  
                                               
12 That proportion is generally below 25% for the questions reported in the preceding tables.  
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The present administration is implementing several actions against corruption. With an 
average score above 2.5 – and with less than 25% neutral or undecided responses – 
respondents perceived these actions to potentially have a positive impact. Such an attitude 
is fully consistent with the emphasis put by respondents on the very negative influence of 
corruption on development.  
Another action that gathered approval among the survey respondents was the reform of the 
power sector and the likely unbundling of the activity of the state monopoly in this area, 
Société Béninoise d'Energie Electrique. This, again, is in agreement with the negative 
opinion of respondents about the management of state-owned companies.    
3.1.4 Response heterogeneity 
To complete the analysis, we now examine whether average scores in the population of 
respondents hide strong differences across specific groups, in which case the conclusions 
obtained above should be somewhat qualified. The way to proceed is simple. It consists of 
testing the statistical difference between the answers of different groups of respondents. To 
be consistent with the strategy used earlier, the emphasis is put on those cases where 
strengths and weaknesses, as defined by an average score, respectively, above 2.5 or 
below 1.5, are present in particular groups of respondents but disappear when considering 
the whole population. This analysis is performed on three subgroups: women vs. men, 
formal firm managers vs other respondents, and financial managers vs other respondents.  
Table 6 illustrates the procedure for the women/men dichotomy. Questions appearing there 
are ranked according to the degree of statistical significance of the difference in average 
scores between the two groups. Two situations arise. The first case is where men are 
strongly positive in their answer and women much less so, so that the general average 
scores are in the neutral interval (1.5, 2.5). This is the case for the confidence that men 
seem to have in political institutions like the Supreme Court or in the discussion of the 
budget in the parliament. The other case is women being strongly negative but men being 
neutral, so that, again, the overall average score is in the neutral interval. This occurs for the 
question on the autonomy of trade unions, for instance, or the question on the 
constitutionality of some government actions. Of course, there are also cases where the 
difference between men and women is significant but on the same side, so that the overall 
average score is little affected. This is the case for the question on familiarity with land laws, 
for which both men and women were negative but to varying degrees.  
The question does arise as to why opinions may differ between men and women on such 
crucial issues as whether political actors behave according to constitutional rules. A possible 
explanation is that many women in the sample of respondents operate in the informal sector 
of the economy and may not have the same familiarity with this kind of issue. Also, they may 
not have the same level of education as other respondents. If this explanation is correct, 
then the constitutionality of political action in Benin should be added to the list of the 
country’s institutional strengths.  
Benin’s institutions and development: insights from alternative evaluation approaches  
© Economic Development & Institutions  23 
Table 6: Top issues with significant differences between men and women 
Question Av. score for women 
Av. score 
for men T-stat 
How truthfully and seriously is economic policy (e.g. 
fiscal policy, taxation, trade etc.) debated within the 
government and in parliament?  
1.97 2.73 3.87 
To what extent do you think that the Haute Cour de 
Justice, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme 
Court effectively enforce compliance with the formal 
rules of the constitution? 
1.53 2.57 3.73 
How reliable (in terms of realism, consistency, 
coverage, degree of detail, coherence) is the budget?  1.35 2.19 3.28 
To what extent do you share the view that foreign aid 
improves the quality of economic policy  0.96 1.74 3.22 
To what extent are trade unions autonomous vis-à-vis 
majority political parties?  0.83 2.00 3.16 
How familiar are you with Beninese land law, i.e. the 
Land Acts? 0.92 1.50 3.13 
To what extent do parliament and the executive 
function according to the constitution? 1.32 2.21 2.97 
 
The same analysis with respect to formal firm or financial institution managers also reveals 
clear differences in information sets. For instance, financial managers had more concerns 
than other respondents about issues related to land and involving formal companies in urban 
areas, or about the ability of the judiciary system to resolve corruption problems. Not 
surprisingly, they were more satisfied with banking regulation. Formal firm managers, on 
their side, were more sensitive to the lack of government transparency on subjects related to 
economic policies and the budget. Except for this, differences with other respondents were 
more a matter of intensity than direction, the same being true of financial managers.   
3.2 The main lessons from the opinion survey: summary 
Although corruption cannot be considered an 'institutional area', it clearly appears in the 
opinion of the respondents as a major cause of institutional weaknesses across the board.  It 
is certainly behind the low opinion expressed in the survey about public management, the 
dissatisfaction with the business environment, and the doubts expressed about the 
functioning of the political system. Corruption is felt to be present everywhere in the 
economic and political system.  
This emphasis on corruption illustrates the fact that the kind of opinion survey undertaken for 
this study of Benin's institutions, like the international comparisons based on synthetic 
indicators in a preceding section of this chapter, provides more information on what people 
and experts feel works well or not so well, than on the dysfunctions or the positive role of 
institutions per se. Corruption is certainly a plague in Benin, but its effects are not 
necessarily well identified.  
Concerning the broad institutional areas, public administration is found to be the weakest link 
in the functioning of the Beninese economy and society, without it being completely clear 
what does not work there, except for the deleterious effect of corruption. For instance, no 
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strong opinion was expressed on civil servants – except for their frequent strikes – or the 
organisation of the whole sector. What is clear, however, is the way this perceived weakness 
of the public administration is behind the dissatisfaction with the business environment, 
which is another strong message of the survey. As far as political institutions are concerned, 
answers to the questionnaire show some ambivalence, with respondents expressing some 
confidence in the way the system works and in current reforms, while at the same time, here 
again, pointing to the harm done by corruption.  
Other weaknesses stressed by the opinion survey include the lack of transparency in regard 
to state actions. This may be the reason why no clear view about the state’s dysfunctions 
were expressed in the survey responses. Opacity makes evaluation difficult, except perhaps 
when results are directly apparent, as is the case with state-owned companies—in the power 
sector in particular.   
On the positive side, there was a broad agreement on civil liberties and the state being free 
of the influence of religion or traditional culture. Such circumstances doubtlessly should be 
favourable to private initiative and unbiased policymaking. Yet there is some lack of 
consistency here between this perceived autonomy of the state, on the one hand, and the 
sense of the detrimental effect of corruption, on the other.  
Overall, the expert opinion survey is a bit disappointing in the sense that it does not point to 
well defined obstacles to development arising from the working of institutions in Benin. A 
possible reason for this may lie in the heterogeneity of opinions depending, on where 
respondents stand in the working of the economic and political system. This is apparent 
when comparing the answers of formal firm or financial organisation managers and those of 
other respondents. Strong perceptions in opposite directions by different groups of 
respondents may tend to neutralise each other. Table 8 in the appendix illustrates that 
heterogeneity by showing how the direct choice of critical broad institutional areas in the first 
stage of the survey differed across selected groups of respondents.     
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4 Institutional implications of ‘growth diagnostics’ and 
similar exercises 
To end this review of insights into the way institutions in Benin may create obstacles to the 
country’s development, we now briefly review the potential institutional implications of 
'growth diagnostics' exercises that have been conducted in Benin in the spirit of the 
Hausmann et al. (2005) methodology over the recent years.  
Two studies of this type have been completed over the last 10 years or so: the first by 
Ianchovichina (2008) for the World Bank and the second for the International Monetary Fund 
by Barhoumi et al. (2016). The former is rather complete but a bit old, as it essentially refers 
to the period 1996–2006. The latter is more recent, but less complete. A related report was 
released more recently by the World Bank (2017a); this presented a Systematic Country 
Diagnostic for Benin built upon a different methodology than growth diagnostics. We 
summarise the main findings of these studies in the following paragraphs, insisting on the 
points that are directly related to the working of institutions. We also complement them with 
some of the results of the World Bank Enterprise Survey – World Bank (2009, 2016), based 
on a sample of firms operating in Benin, as these provide further interesting evidence on 
some of the points raised in the preceding studies. 
• The World Bank 2008 growth diagnostic 
The growth diagnostic approach relies on a simple model of optimal growth leading to a set 
of key determinants of growth performance. Considering these determinants one by one, the 
objective is then to determine the extent to which they are constraining the development of a 
country in a given time period. 
Referring to the decade ending in the mid-2000s, Ianchovichina (2008) identifies three sets 
of binding constraints:  
o Poor quality of infrastructure 
As at 2008, Benin displayed infrastructure deficiencies in different areas. Notably, power 
supply (in quantity and quality) was the leading constraint on business, as most firms had to 
bear the cost of installing their own power-generation capacity. In the same way, poor 
services in railway and roads undermined Benin’s geographical advantage to serve 
landlocked countries (Burkina Faso and Niger) to its north. Moreover, lack of adequate rural 
roads, poor logistics in transport and storage facilities, as well as deficiencies in water 
management and irrigation impeded progress in agriculture and the agrobusiness industry.  
o High risks on return appropriation: the tax issue  
In the Investment Climate Assessment of 2004, used in the World Bank growth di agnostic, 
firms reported difficult challenges in dealing with the tax administration: a complex tax 
system coupled with high tax rates, heavy bureaucratic burden, and corruption. In the same 
way, they reported serious problems in the judicial administration: long and costly litigation 
procedures in resolving conflicts, especially in land and financial markets, and, there too, a 
high level of corruption. These were considered as strong deterrents to business dynamism.  
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o Poor quality of human capital 
Although the availability of skilled labour did not appear to be a binding constraint in 2008, it 
was noted that Benin was lagging in term of the quality of education, so that it was felt that 
human capital could become a constraint in the future. This is still the case today. A recent 
comparative analysis among 10 francophone African countries13 shows that primary school 
pupils in Benin are performing worse in reading and mathematics than those in peer 
countries (PASEC, 2014) 14. Moreover, significantly low learning competencies are found for 
children in rural areas, as well as those from poor families. This limits inclusive growth and 
has certainly contributed to the rising of inequality over the past years.  
The World Bank 2008 growth diagnostic also noted that, by 2005, the pressure on land was 
mounting. If the utilisation rate of land was still quite below full capacity in the north of the 
country, this was not the case in the south. For instance, the utilisation rate of cultivable land 
in the département of Ouémé was reported to be 96%.  
As can be seen, several of these binding – or potentially binding – constraints identified in 
2008 are related to institutional issues which have been mentioned in the opinion survey 
completed for the present study.  
• The 2016 IMF growth diagnostic  
The Barhoumi et al. (2016) study, completed 10 years later, is not as comprehensive. It 
focuses on the way investment may be scaled up in Benin. The binding constraints that it 
identifies echo those identified by Ianchovichina (2017) and the opinion survey analysed 
above. Of special importance in that study is the infrastructure constraint, especially in the 
power sector, and the tax system, which is seen as being responsible for lower tax revenues 
and therefore an impediment to the scaling up of investment. Concerning the tax system, the 
diagnostic insists both on the complexity of the system, but also on the inefficiency of the tax 
collection apparatus, which leads to many firms simply not paying taxes, either legally 
through loopholes or illegally through corrupt practices. The reason why the tax/GDP ratio of 
Benin is comparable to that in other sub-Saharan African countries is essentially because of 
the relative importance of custom duties on re-exports in the direction of Nigeria.  
• The World Bank 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic 
The Systematic Country Diagnostic (World Bank, 2017a) replaced the old Country 
Assistance Strategy documents in the relationship between the World Bank and low-income 
countries. It is the analytical background document for the preparation of the Country 
Partnership Framework (CPF). In the case of Benin, the last CPF was signed in 2018, for the 
2019–23 period.    
The Systematic Country Diagnostic 2017 identified the following areas of weakness for the 
development of Benin, and therefore pathways of action within the CPF: infrastructure, with 
emphasis this time on transport and logistics in order to capitalise on the Port of Cotonou; 
informality, caused by the illegal nature of cross-border trade with Nigeria; service delivery, 
especially in the education sector; and the need for developing more effective social safety 
                                               
13 Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Chad, Togo, and Niger. 
14 Poor development of learning outcomes at higher education levels, especially at university, was also highlighted during the 
workshop with the decision makers. 
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nets. In addition, the Government of Benin committed in the final version of the CPF to 
enhancing its efforts in improving public management, and governance more generally15.  
Again, several of these areas match some of the conclusions derived from the opinion 
survey carried out for the present study, especially those concerned with public 
management, infrastructure, and, implicitly, corruption, since this is what is behind the 
commitment to better 'governance'.  From that point of view the Systematic Country 
Diagnostic and CPF are quite clear – it is said in the opening remarks: 
The political economy [of Benin] is characterized by a concentration of powerful 
interests and a resulting uneven playing field, weak institutions, poor governance, 
and incidents of corruption. As elaborated in the SCD [Systematic Country 
Diagnostic], Benin’s potential for achieving the twin goals [i.e. poverty reduction and 
shared prosperity] has faltered for several reasons, including those related to political 
economy: low levels of trust between economic agents, weak institutions, and poor 
governance. (CPF, page 3) 
If such an official document, endorsed by the government, is so clear, it may be surprising 
that the respondents to the survey analysed in the preceding section were shyer in their 
evaluation of Benin's institutions. The reason has probably to be found in the mechanical 
format of the questionnaire, which in some cases did not allow respondents to express their 
deep convictions.  
• The 2009–2016 World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
Although there was no diagnostic attached to them, it seems interesting to check the 
Enterprise Surveys carried out by the World Bank, to see whether their findings match the 
binding constraints identified by the preceding growth diagnostics. The answer is that they 
do. In the various types of information collected by these surveys, the largest difference 
between Beninese firms and firms in other sub-Saharan African countries appear under the 
following headings. Corruption: bribery incidence has declined between 2009 and 2016 and 
is lower in Benin than in other sub-Saharan African countries, but Benin very much 
dominates other countries in terms of gifts given to get government contracts, construction 
permits, or a favourable judgement in court. Infrastructure: power supply is much lower and 
outages are more frequent in Benin than in other sub-Saharan African countries; moreover, 
the situation has been getting worse since 2009. Informality: seen as a major source of 
unfair competition by formal firms, again more in Benin than in the rest of sub-Saharan 
African. The same applies to tax rates and the tax administration. 
Summing up, the growth diagnostic exercises conducted in relation to Benin over the last 
decade or so are rather convergent in pointing to several key weaknesses that have clear 
institutional roots: intense corruption, inefficient public management (including infrastructure, 
service delivery and, especially, the tax administration), and a high level of informality.  
                                               
15 See tables 2–4 in World Bank (2018). 
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5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed expert opinions on the quality of institutions in Benin and the way this 
could affect the country’s development performance. Three types of evidence were 
considered: synthetic indicators available in cross-country databases; a specific opinion 
survey carried out among local decision makers of different types and engaged in different 
activities; and analysis of the institutional implications of binding economic constraints 
identified in several recent growth diagnostic exercises. These various sources converge in 
pointing out several institutional weaknesses that impede an acceleration of development in 
Benin, even though they may not always agree on the severity of these institutional 
constraints. 
Corruption is unanimously seen as the most serious impediment to the good functioning of 
institutions and a favourable development context. Corruption is found to affect practically all 
sectors of the economy at all levels of responsibility. This is recognised by both the 
respondents to the opinion survey and the authors of growth diagnostic exercises. 
Comparison with other countries in the region or countries that have out-performed Benin 
over the last decades is less conclusive. If Enterprise Surveys find that, from the point of 
view of business, the situation in Benin is substantially worse than in the average sub-
Saharan African country, country-by-country comparison leads to different conclusions. The 
degree of corruption in Benin, as can be appraised through synthetic indicators, turns out to 
be roughly comparable to that in neighbour countries. Corruption might be even less serious 
than in several countries that grew faster than Benin over the last 20 years, this being true 
today as well as 10 or 20 years ago. Such findings may reflect the conceptual imprecision of 
synthetic corruption indicators, but they also call for a more nuanced analysis of the effects 
of corruption on the development of a specific country.  
Weak public management is the second unanimously recognised source of hindrance in the 
process of development. Of course, this may partly be the consequence of corruption. Here 
too, the cross-country difference in synthetic indicators of the quality of public management 
across countries is not strongly unfavourable to Benin. Yet some sectors are singled out as 
particularly weak by survey respondents and analysts. Three of them are repeatedly singled 
out. The tax system is found to be complex and the tax administration grossly inefficient in 
collecting tax revenues, with clear adverse consequences for the dependency of Benin on 
foreign finance. The power sector, run by a state-owned monopoly, is found to perform badly 
due to weak or ineffective regulation. Finally, if the delivery of social services, especially 
education, is found to have made progress in quantity, this is not the case for quality. Benin 
underperforms in relation to other sub-Saharan African countries by a wide margin and, from 
that point of view, lags very much behind the countries that grew faster, from roughly the 
same initial level of income, over the last 20 years.  
The opacity of government policymaking to the public, very much stressed by survey 
respondents, is probably to be imputed to weak public management, but it is also a sign of 
deficient political institutions, generally regarded as weaker than in other sub-Saharan 
African countries. From that point of view, however, survey respondents are somewhat 
ambivalent. On the one hand, many of them tend to trust constitutional institutions and are 
confident of the success of some current reforms. On the other hand, most also agree that 
the whole system is deeply corrupt and, because of this, often dysfunctional. Such a severe 
judgement even appears in the opening remarks of the official CPF, a document signed 
between the Government of Benin and the World Bank.    
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Available statistics show that informality is more developed in Benin than in the average sub-
Saharan African country. Growth diagnostic analyses suggest that informality has a cost in 
terms of tax revenues, job precariousness, and lack of control over the economy. This is not 
a point that appears strongly in the opinion survey, perhaps because of the presence of a 
substantial group of informal firm managers in the sample. It is not a dimension of institutions 
that appears explicitly in the synthetic indicators provided by international databases. Yet the 
reason why informality is more developed in Benin is clear: it is more the result of the 
importance of the illegal cross-border trade with Nigeria than it is the result of some specific 
institutional failure. However, its consequences for the functioning of institutions are serious.  
A last area deserves mention, even though it was not prominent as such in the opinion 
survey and was not explicitly covered by the synthetic indicators: it is the way land allocation 
is managed. One of the growth diagnostic studies mentions that land is becoming scarce in 
the southern part of the country, so that managing it efficiently will become more and more 
crucial in the future.  As in other sub-Saharan African countries, land operations raise 
difficulties in Benin because of the uncertain status of ownership and the legacy of 
customary practices. A reform was passed in 2013, which, according to the opinion survey, 
is complex and does not really resolve the sources of land conflict. Land laws and their 
implementation reveal institutional weaknesses whose economic consequences may be 
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Appendix 
Table 7: Overview of the 10 broad institutional areas 
Cluster code Broad institutional area Areas covered 
A Political institutions 
Functioning of political institutions and political life; popular participation; civil liberties; 
transparency and accountability; corruption; state capacity; interference of non-state organisations 
in policymaking; recruitment of politicians 
B Law and order, justice, and security Rule of law; functioning of judicial system; protection of civil liberties; control of violence; supervision of public companies; business law and its implementation 
C Functioning of public administration 
State capacity; transparency of economic policy and reporting; corruption; public procurement; 
supervision of public companies; geographical coverage of public services; relationship with 
business sector; regulation; decentralisation 
D Ease of doing business 
Relationship with public administration; privatisation, public procurement; price controls; 
competition regulation; foreign direct investments; functioning of credit and capital markets; 
litigation procedures; labour market regulation; role of trade unions; recruitment of business 
leaders 
E Dealing with land rights  
Access to land for business purposes (urban and rural); role of local communities; role of public 
administration; security of property rights (or equivalent in view of state property principle); conflict 
settlement and functioning of land courts 
F Long-term and strategic planning 
Ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of policy; communication on economic policy; capacity to 
coordinate stakeholders; long-run and strategic vision of development; obstacles to public action; 
decentralisation  
G Market regulation 
Capacity to regulate market competition; regulation of utilities; regulation of foreign direct 
investments; regulation of financial sector; regulation of labour market; quality of system of 
information on firms 
H Security of transactions and contracts Security of contracts and property rights; insolvency law; litigation procedures; business laws and business courts 
I Relations with the rest of the world  Trade openness; financial openness; relations with neighbouring countries; attitude towards foreign direct investments; ease of starting a business; land tenure security; relations with donors 
J Social cohesion, social protection, and solidarity 
Popular participation in policy debates; civil liberties; access to justice system; sense of national 
identity; discriminatory practices; geographical coverage of public services; instruments of social 
protection; traditional solidarity  
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Table 8: Institutional choices across selected groups 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Groups A B C D E F G H I J 
Beninese nationality 
0.100 -0.159 0.177 -0.325*** 0.335*** -0.0216 -0.150 -0.00605 -0.203** 0.253** 
(0.124) (0.115) (0.122) (0.116) (0.115) (0.102) (0.101) (0.0557) (0.0903) (0.113) 
Female 
-0.162** -0.0664 -0.0988 0.167*** 0.0154 -0.0586 0.100* 0.00309 0.0941** 0.00617 
(0.0648) (0.0607) (0.0643) (0.0611) (0.0610) (0.0535) (0.0529) (0.0293) (0.0475) (0.0599) 
Formal firms 
-0.117* -0.109* -0.0558 0.176*** -0.00458 -0.0861* 0.0894* 0.102*** 0.0762* -0.0714 
(0.0619) (0.0576) (0.0613) (0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0509) (0.0504) (0.0274) (0.0453) (0.0569) 
Large 
-0.160** 0.00953 -0.0573 0.199*** -0.0632 -0.0586 0.0869 0.0792** 0.0281 -0.0635 
(0.0761) (0.0713) (0.0754) (0.0716) (0.0713) (0.0627) (0.0621) (0.0341) (0.0559) (0.0701) 
Medium 
-0.00777 -0.224 -0.0829 0.168 -0.0212 -0.0150 0.298** -0.0544 0.0420 -0.103 
(0.161) (0.149) (0.158) (0.151) (0.150) (0.132) (0.130) (0.0719) (0.117) (0.147) 
Small and micro 
-0.0311 -0.245** -0.0166 0.0589 0.121 -0.136 -0.0379 0.174*** 0.154** -0.0421 
(0.153) (0.143) (0.150) (0.142) (0.140) (0.126) (0.124) (0.0689) (0.113) (0.142) 
Financial institutions 
-0.266* 0.0156 -0.255* -0.0885 0.185 0.122 0.214* 0.0313 0.00781 0.0339 
(0.146) (0.137) (0.144) (0.139) (0.137) (0.121) (0.119) (0.0658) (0.107) (0.135) 
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 9: Institutional choices across selected groups 
Coefficients of a regression of a dummy variable defined by whether a broad institutional area is considered as critical by the respondent or not over some characteristics of 
respondents. Stars reflect the statistical significance of the coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Groups A B C D E F G H I J 
Financial institution managers -0.262* 0.00330 -0.228 -0.130 0.236* 0.132 0.179 0.0272 -0.0116 0.0528 
Retired civil servants 0.125 0.0336 -0.0156 -0.198 0.191 0.0714 -0.238* -0.0561 0.00360 0.0831 
Agriculture, commerce, and 
industry operators -0.143 -0.225** 0.0705 0.0941 0.262** 0.167* -0.132 -0.0561 -0.126 0.0879 
Local politicians  0.266 -0.219 0.106 -0.380** 0.292* 0.0209 -0.0154 -0.0561 -0.178 0.164 
Other constitutional bodies -0.0671 0.0774 0.254** -0.268*** 0.254*** -0.0902 -0.201** 0.0180 -0.0671 0.0898 
Teachers and professors  0.0339 -0.148 0.257* -0.289** 0.372*** 0.0714 -0.238* -0.0561 -0.0873 0.0831 
Trade unions and civil society 0.488* 0.170 -0.311 -0.380 -0.264 0.299 0.0124 0.194* -0.178 -0.0305 
